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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
State v . Petro, 148 Ohio St., 473, holds as 
follows in paragraph eleven of the syllabus : 
"In a criminal case wher·e pro,2f bey:.)nd a reason-
able doubt i~ required, this court will look to 
the record to ascertain whether or not such rule 
has been disregarded . " 
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE C ONVICT~ON 
Evidence of the State permits a rational 
hypothesis of innocence. It does not point unerringly 
to guilt. It is consistent with innoc~nce. 
It is conceded that Mrs. Sheppard, a vigorous 
athletic young woman~ struggled violently with her 
assailant who attacked her while she was in bed in her 
bed room sometime between the hours of 12:50 A.M. and 
5:30 A.M., July 4, 1954. 
RED AND BLUE WOOL FIBERS UNDER THE FINGER NAILS 
OF THE DECEASED 
Miss Cowan, a technician in ~he office of the 
Coroner of Cuyahoga County testified fo r the State. She 
testified as follows concerning the red and blue wool 
fibers under the nails of the deceased. 
"Q. I can't see it. Anyway we will take 
Exhibit DD and will you tell w~at that ~s? 
"A. I have two slides here on it. 
"Q. Do you have to have a microscope? 
"A. Yes, sir, but I did check these before I 
brought them down. 
"Q. Will you· tell me what 1 t is? 
"A. This is the one .that contains the dark blue 
wool fiber and the fine blue fiber and the 
fractured hair. 
"Q. This slide here contains a blue fiber and 
a red fiber? 
"A. No, a blue wool fiber and a blue cctton 
fiber. 
"Q. A blue wool fiber and a blue cotton fiber 
and a fractured hair? 
I 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And that was under the finger of which hand? 
"A. The middle finger of the right hand." 
* * * * 
"Q. Now, then handing you Exhibit EEEE, will you 
state what that is? 
"A. That is the fiber from under the nail of the 
right thumb." 
The fibers found under the finger. and thumb nails 
of the victim did not come from the apparel of the defendant 
nor from anything over which the defendant had any contrcl. 
The State offers no explanation as to the origin of these 
fibers -- none whatever. The State dismissed that vital 
and important circumstance as "insignificant." 
3 
Not infrequently a conviction for second degree 
manslaughter in a "hit skip" automobile occurrence is 
obtained largely from finding fibers cf cloth clinging to 
the mechanism of the automobile which matches the cloth 
worn by the person killed. Had the State been able to 
establish that these wool fibers under the nails of the 
decedent matched clothing of the defendant, it would have 
urged strenuously that such evidence proved guilt. How-
ever, when the evidence of the State failed to explain or 
account for the presence of these cloth fibers under the 
nails of decedent, the Prosecutor has nothing to say. 
This vital link in the cnain of circumstances is 
not only consistent with innocence of the defendant, but 
points to some other person. 
THE PIECE OF LEATHERETTE OR LEATHER 
A piece of leatherette or leather was found in 
the bed room under or near the bed. There is some confu-
sion as to just when this piece of leather was found. 
Officer Drenkham testified that he found a piece of leather 
on the morning of July 4th which was the morning of the 
killing. Another Officer said he found a piece of leather 
on the morning of July 5th. This confusion in the State's 
testimony is not vital. We will however take the testimony 
most favorable to the State being that of the Coroner 
Dr. Samuel R. Gerber who testified as follows: 
"Q. Now, to get back to July 5th when you 
say you met Mr. Rossbach and Mr. Yettra and 
certain other police officers, what time of 
the day was that? 
"A. It was around 10 o'clock in the morning. 
"Q. And did you again go up to the bedroom? 
"A. Yes. 
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"Q. And was anything picked up at that visit? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And what was picked up? 
"A. There was a piece of nail polish and a 
piece of - a very smal1 piece of what appears 
to be leather or leatherette. 
"Q. And do you have those with you? 
"A. May I have them, please? 
"Q. (Exhibit) 43 contains this brown fragment 
that you just referred to? 
"A. Yes. 
(This was the piece of leatherette or leather) 
'
1Q. It is a little triangular piece about a 
quarter of an inch on each side of the triangle 
approximately? 
"A. Approximately, yes. " 
The foregoing was direct examination. 
"Q. Did you coordinate it with anything that 
you found in Dr. Sheppard's house? 
"A. We attempted to. 
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"Q. Well, did you? 
"A. We were not able to. 
"Q. But you made that attempt? 
"A. Y 1 es, s r. 
"Q. And did you do that personally, or was 
that done by one of your professional chemists? 
"A. I did that personally. 
"Q. And what day did you do that? 
"A. Right along whenever I saw -
"Q. That is you made a continuing -
"A. Observation. 
"Q. -- observation to determine if in any way 
you could fit this piece of leather or leather-
ette into any object connected with the 
Sheppard home. 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. And in that connection what did you 
examine? 
"A. Anything that - well, in the first place, 
we tried to connect it with the shoes · and there 
wasn't any place missing on the shoes. We tried 
to connect it up with a quirt and there was 
nothing - no defect in the quirt that would fit 
into - that it would fit into, and there was 
other (3258) things that were observed in the 
house and not brought in. 
"Q. Well, I suppose you found in that house a 
great many things? 
"A. No. We found very few things that you 
could even consider had any possibility of it 
coming from. 
"Q. Well, you found shoes and you found some 
purses. 
; 
"A. Yes, and we found a quirt. 
"Q. And you found a golf bag? 
"A. It didn't come from the gclf bag. 
"Q. And you found leather grips on the golf 
clubs? 
nA. Yes, Si!'. 
"Q. And did you find any chairs around there 
that were cover~d with leather that you at-
tempted to match it with? 
"A. It had no appearance - the ~hairs bad no 
appearance that it could c;ome from them. " 
* * * * 
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"Q. Well, you made a thorcugh search as far as 
humanly possible? 
"A . We attempt-=d itjl yes, sir." 
The only explanation that th~ State gives to 
account for the presence of this piece of leather in the 
death room was that the police and coroner permitted 
photographers to come in and take pictures. No attempt 
whatsoever was made to explain the presence of the piece 
of leather. Again we might observe that the Coroner made 
the most diligent effort to find leather material in the 
home that would match this piece of leather. None was 
found. The Coroner recognized the compelling evidentia~y 
value of this piece of leather if connected with the 
defendant. There was no su~h connection. The coroner 
knew that this piece of leather did not come from anyone 
permitted to enter the bedroom. In his mind he connected 
_...__.. __ ....,..,.__ ~=-=-=-~-=-=~~~__J-
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it with the killer. 
In a circumstantial eviden~e case the law 
requires that all material circumstances be established 
beyond a reasonable doubt and that the chain of circum-
stances must point unerringly to guilt and be irreconci-
able with any rational hypothesis of innocenoe. The 
unexplained cloth fibers under the· finger and thumb 
nails of the deceased and the piece of leather found in 
the death room shortly after the discovery of the crime 
indicates the presence in the death room of a person other 
than the defendant or his wife at the time of the murder. 
THE BLOOD PATTERN AND THE "T 11 SHIRT 
The State concedes that at 12 : 50 A.M. July 4th, 
the defendant was wearing a "T 11 Shirt; that about 5:30 A.M. 
of the same day he was not wearing the "T" Shirt. This 
is the only inference relative to the "T" Shirt. It may 
be inferred that the shirt was removed between the above 
hours. The State builds inference upon inference with 
no evidence whatsoever to support them. From the fore-
going the State infers that the defendant went upstairs 
and killed his wife, after a violent struggle, during 
which blood was splattered all over the "T" shirt; that 
the defendant then by some unexplained method concealed 
; 
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the "T" shirt because it was drenched with blood. To 
support these inferences, the State collides with factual 
circumstances consistent with innocen~e. Defendant's 
trousers had absolutely no blood on them above the knee. 
The State's evidence and exhibits disclose that 
the victim's blood went downward, outward, and upward in 
a spray of countless droplets. The blood spread outside 
lines of a triangle the apex of which would be at the body 
or head of the dead woman. The edges of the bed were 
sprayed with blood and the walls and ceiling on both sides 
of the triangle. We agree with the State that the killer 
interrupted a part of this torrent of blood. There was no 
blood within the area of the triangle excepting a large 
glob on a wardrobe very close to the bed. The State in 
building up its inferences about blood being splattered on 
the "T" Shirt then are faced with the dilemma occasioned 
by the evidence of the State that there was absolutely no 
blood on the trousers between the knee and the waist. No 
testimony whatever was offered to explain this phenomena. 
With spraying blood going out of the deceased from the edge 
of the bed which was about knee high nnd with the one 
exception, none back of the assailant the query arises 
immediately : why was there no blood between the knees and 
the waist of the defendant's trousers? The State concedes 
that blood would have gotten upon the defendant's trousers 
9 
in that area. There is no evidence whatever offered to 
explain just how no blood got on the trousers in that area 
when, if the defendant committed the crime, his trousers 
would have been right in the midst of the torrential 
spattering of blood from the victim. The State recognizes 
this situation and on page 86 of its brief in this Court 
gives the following amazing explanation in this language~ 
"'The absence of numerous fine drops of blood 
on appellant's trousers, belt, shoes, socks, 
and shorts.' The evidence shows that the 
blood splattered upward and it may well be 
that the defendant's T-shirt sufficiently 
covered the upper part of his trousers." 
(State's Exhibit 9 shows drops of blood went 
downward also.) 
There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever to 
support this amazing foray into the field of speculation. 
There is no evidence whether the T-shirt was stuffed into 
the trousers or whether the T-shirt was outside of the 
trousers. There is no evidence whatsoever as to the 
length of the T-shirt. The State had available numerous 
T-shirts that the defendant wore from time to time. None 
of these were presented to show the length of such T-shirts ; 
that the defendant habitually wore during the summer. Yet 
the State now says that "it may well be" that the defendant's 
T-shirt extended clear down to his knees. This speculation 
doesn't help the State because · blood would penetrate 
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through thin cotton and appear on the tro'.lsers. The 
Prosecution urged this wild speculation to the Jury in 
the Court of Appeals and again here. We do not find that 
the Court of Appeals gave any explanation of the cloth 
fibers found under the fingernails of the decedent, nor 
the piece of leather, nor the admission by the State that 
under its evidence blood must have gotten onto the trousers 
of the killer, there being no blood on defendant's 
trousers above the knee. 
language: 
At page 86 of the State's briAf i s this further 
"The State, of course, contends that the 
defendant disposed of his T-shirt be~ause 
it was spattered with blood." 
Again comeo the question why d1dn 1 t some of the 
spattering blood get on the trousers ? 
BLOOD TYPING 
At page 4 775 of th·e Bill of Exceptions, it is 
disclosed that the official, final conclusicns of the 
coroner aa set cut in his report, which is required by 
law, that the blood t.yping of the deceased was 0 Rh nega-
t1ve, type MS." 
The same rep~irt dis closes the following: 
; 
"Watches: Man's yellow metal wristwatch 
(Dr. Sheppard's wristwatch here involved) 
crusted stains yield positive test for 
human blood, type M." 
Defendant 1 s blood is type AB2 . 
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There was no 0 blood on the watch. There was no 
MS factor on the watch. It was typed "M". The defendant 
testified to two violent physical encounters that he had 
with the assailant of his wife. Of course, the State 
argues that the jury did not have to believe that. How-
ever, the official coroner's report required by law shows 
a distinct difference in the blood grouping and typing of 
the decedent's blood and that on the wristwatch of the 
defendant. Again the State fails to explain this vital 
difference. The blood on defendant's wristwatch was 
neither his nor his wife's. Certainly ~he jury should not 
conclude that the typing of blood on the wristwatch was 
entirely different than that stated in the coroner's 
report. 
The State's own evidence is compelling that 
someone different than the defendant was wearing apparel 
in the deathroom that contained red nnd blue fibers, a 
portion of his attire (probably a leatherette jacket plaid 
lined) produced the piece of leather gouged out by the 
fingernails of the deceased. Likewise a total failure of 
any blood on the defendant's trousers from the knee to 
12 
, 
the waist, completely unexplained by any evidence or in any 
other logical manner, strongly indicates the presence in the 
room of another person. Then comes the coroner's official 
report that discloses blood on the defendant's wristwatch 
to be of a different grouping or typing from that of his 
wife or his own. This further indicates another person and 
tends at least to support the defendant's testimony that he 
engaged in a violent struggle with the assailant. 
Miss Cowen was the technician in the office of 
the coroner and here is what she has to say in her testi-
mony on direct examination~ 
"Q. ·And did you type that blood? 
"A. Yes, sir, I did. 
"Q. And what was the result of your experiment? 
"A. The typing was tjping 0 -blood. It was 
later determined that the type was OM. 11 
This was the typing of Marilyn Sheppard's blood. 
How can that testimony be reconciled with the coroner's . 
official report when he says that the deceased's blood was 
"group 0 Rh negative, type MS." 
It is hardly conceivable that a jury of laymen 
should be permitted to speculate in a highly scientific 
field and endeavor to reconcile the coroner's official 
report with the testimony of his laboratory technician. 
However, the blood on the w~istwatch of the defendant was 
; 
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not the same type as his Wife's nor of his own. That blood 
came from somebody else. Was it the blood of the man with 
whom Dr. Sheppard had two violent encounters according to 
his account or is there presented a rationa l hypotheses 
consistent with innocence? 
The foregoing link of circumstancial and direct 
evidence pointing to innocence as well as other circum-
stances likewise pointing to innocence , with which we will 
not burden the Court, are unexplained by the State. 
However, before leaving the T-shirt we quote 
again from the State's brief at page 60: 
"The evidence discloses that when Marilyn 
Sheppard was beaten to death, there were 
spurts of blood outward and upward , some 
of which landed high on the walls . Such 
spurts of blood would hnve necessarily 
landed all over a T-shirt on the assailant 
standing or leaning over the victim. 11 
By what mysterious legerdemain did the blood spurt outward 
and land "all over a T-shirt on the assailant standing or 
leaning over the victim" and yet miraculously fail to cause 
the slightest drop to get en the defendant's trousers between 
the waist and the knee? 
In civil cases the rule is that the plaintiff must 
explain and account for the effectiveness of causes which 
are not attributable to the defendant. The motion for leave 
to appeal should be sustained that this Court may announce 
a rule determining if the State in a criminal prosecution 
14 
must explain circumstances intimately connected with the 
crime for which the defendant on ~rial is in no way con-
nected. The State has not by any evidence or other 
explanation accounted for the failure of this rain of blood 
going outward from the victim and failing to get on the 
trousers of the defendant between the knee and his waist. 
We will now discuss the cha in of circumstances 
upon which the State relies for conviction as disclosed 
in the State's brief from page 59 to 67. 
"l. The folded jacket on the couch. " Where was 
the jacket? Was it under the defendant as he lay there on 
-the cquch, was it at the head or was it at the foot or just 
where was it? Certainly it can't be concluded that the 
defendant failed to muss up the jacket when he went up-
stairs. It proves nothing. The defendant says that he 
went upstairs and so does the State, so the folded jacket 
is no evidence of guilt whatsoever and is consistent with 
innocence. 
"2. The missing T-shirt. II We agree that. the 
T-shirt was on the defendant at 12:15 a. m. and was not on 
him at 5:50 a. m. This is a fact; now what are the inf er-
ences? The State infers that at precisely the time of the 
killing the defendant was wearing the T-shirt. The only 
inference that can be drawn is that sometime between 
around 12:15 a.m. and 5:30 a.m. the T-shirt was removed. 
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The inferences that the defendant was wearing the shirt, 
killed his wife and got blood all over the T-shirt by 
reason of innumerable spurts none of which got on his 
trousers, the defendant had to get rid of the T-shirt, and 
that he did, are inference on inference. 
"3. No struggle in room?" Dr. Adelson testified 
with certainty that Marilyn's mouth -- that is the interior -
was injured by some object in her mouth, and that the 
abrasions in her mouth might well have been caused by the 
insertion of the assailant's finger. The State admits 
that there was a struggle. At page 61 it is said in the 
State's brief: 
'
1It mny well be, as the defense suggests, 
that the victim fought and struggled with 
her assailant, and it may well be that 
some of the injuries to her hand resulted 
from that struggle;" 
· At page 62 this statement: 
"This theory, like other theories advanced 
by the defense, DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE 
DEFENDANT AS HER ASSAILANT." 
There is no burden upon the defendant to exclude 
anybody. It is the burden of the State to establish the 
guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
testimony of the State does not exclude another person. In 
fact it indicates that there was an assailant other than 
the defendant. 
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11 4. Victim's rings still on her fingers." · The 
State's evidence establishes that at the morgue there was 
experienced considerable difficulty in removing the rings 
from the victim's fingers. However, that her rings were 
not removed was no evidence that her husband killed her. 
11 5. No evidence of sexual attack." That does 
not furnish any proof of guilt of defendant. 
11 6. Victim's wristwatch." There was no evidence 
as to how long is required for blood to dry or congeal. It 
is a scientific fact that blood begins to congeal immed-
iately upon exposure to air. An obje~t lying in wet blood 
and removed will still leave the imprint of the place where 
it rested however that is no evidence whatsoever as to the 
guilt of the defendant. 
"7. Bloody splotch on pillow." There was a 
splotch on the pillow. One inference is permitted. This 
inference is that it was an object, a surgica1 instrument 
or something similar to a surgica l instrument. There is 
no description of any surgical instrument that would fit 
the splotch. However, there being a splotch and no object 
found the only inference permissible is that some object 
was laying there. However from that inference the State 
draws the further inference that this object, whatever it 
was, was used to beat in the head of Mrs. Sheppard. How-
ever that does not exclude another person. 
; 
17 
11 8. Blood on defendant's wristwatch. ti There was 
blood on defendant's wristwatch but according to coroner's 
official report it did not type the same as his wife's 
blood, nor was it the defendant's. This tends to indicate 
another person and to exclude the defendant. 
"9. The green bag. 11 The defendant's wristwatch 
and some keys were found in this green bag. How they got 
there is unexplained. However at page 64 of the State's 
brief, referring to the defendant's watch it is said that: 
11 The upper band of which was smeared with blood. 11 
This certainly would hav~ furnished a sufficient ~uantity 
of blood to make a thorough analysis which was done and 
the group and typing was different from his wife's blood. 
The green bag instance is of nn evidential value - it does 
nqt exclude another assailant and the blood typing indic · 
ates that the defendant did not participate in any struggle 
with his wife. 
11 10. One bloody smudge on the defendant's 
trousers but no other blood." 
Dr. Sheppard went up to attend his wife whom he 
thought was in a convulsion due to pregnancy. The State 
says that he went upstairs also. Everyone agrees that the 
bed was literally soaked with blood. The doctor felt the 
pulse at the neck. His knee was the height of the blood 
soaked mattress and pressed against it. This single spot 
18 
of blood on the trousers knee does not reconcile with the 
evidence claimed by the State of a shower of blood going 
outward on the assailant while he was bending over her. 
"11. Absence of fingerprints." Somebody it 
appears endeavored to wipe off fingerprints. Does that 
indicate that only a husband would do that or from common 
experience would not a person with a criminal record be 
the one who would try to erase evidence of his crime? Is 
it natural to assume that fingerprints will be found in 
every inhabited house? Chip's palm print was found. Is 
that evidence that Chip killed his mother? 
"12. Blood sta ins around the house." There were 
bloo9 stains about the house. When they got there is not 
disclosed. How many years old is not shown. Was it fresh 
blood? All of these questions could have been answered by 
the Coroner's technicians but were not. 
Probably any house has blood spots on it and in 
it. At pages 65 and 66 of the State's brief the following: 
"We do know of the spilling of human blood 
during the early morning of July 4, 1954, 
and · a jury would have been fully justified 
in concluding from all of the other facts 
before it and the fact that some of it was 
human blood and from the location where it 
was found, the stairways to the kitchen and 
to the basement, that it was the victim's 
blood, and that the person dropping it was 
the defendant." 
; 
Well the evidence conclusively shows that it did 
not drop from the trousers because with one slight exception 
there was no blood on the trousers. It could not have dropped 
from the T-shirt because the laws of gravity would have 
required such blood to have run down on the trousers. To 
claim that it dropped from the defendant's hands would 
likewise require tha t the jury concluded that he went 
around with his hands outspread so tha t it would not get 
on his trousers. There is inference on inference. There 
is absolutely no testimony whatsoever as to when the blood 
got on these steps. If it were fresh blood certainly the 
pathol·ogist and the technician would have known tha t. 
Probably they did and the State failed to bring out such 
information. 
11 13. Wa ter under defendant's wristwatch crystal." 
The defendant says that he was in the lake. Obviously 
water could well get into his crystal. There is no evidence 
on the part of the State whatsoever as to where the water 
came from. The State undoubtedly by reason of its labora-
tories, facilities which are the finest, tested the water. 
; 
Was it lake water? Or was it tap water? Those questions 
are left unanswered by the State. All that is left is 
inference on inference. 
"14. The dog, Koko, was not heard to bark." 
Does that prove that he did not bark? This was in the 
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dead hours of the early morning. That neighbors did not hear 
him bark certainly does not prove that he didn't bark; furth-
ermore, the evidence is undisputed that strangers from the 
hospital frequently came into the house all hours of the 
night to see the doctor, to get advice as to medication or 
- to advise him relative to the conditions of patients, and 
the dog didn't bark. Numerous folks f r om various parts of 
the State were frequently in the house. 
"15. Burglary picture confused." This sub-head 
affords no proof whatsoever of guilt. The prosecution is 
merely endeavoring to question a suggestion that there may 
have been a burglary. 
The foregoing fif teen sub-heads constitute the 
State's claim to have convicted the defendant beyond all 
reasonable doubt, As against those circumstances, most 
of which are consistent with inn~cence, the State does not 
explain by way of evidence or otherwise the presence of 
red and blue cloth fibers under the nail of the victim, 
the presence of the piece of leather under or nenr the bed 
either on the morning of July 4 or the next morning. There 
was not a scratch on the body of the defendant, though the 
evidence is clear that the victim scratched and clawed her 
assailant. The assailant, according to the State, was 
bending or leaning over Mrs. Sheppard and in the direct 
path of a torrent of blood, yet no blood was found on 
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defendant's trousers from the knee up. Blood typing by the 
State shows blood on defendant's wristwatch was not his 
wife's. 
THE LAW 
15 Ohio Jurisprudence, 2d p. 630, Section 462: 
"However, when circumstantial evidence alone 
is relied upon for conviction it must be of 
such a chara cter that it is wholly inconsistent 
with any other conclusion than that the party 
charged is guilty of the crime. These circum-
stances themselves must be thoroughly proved 
and must all point in the same direction, and 
together must .be irreconcilable with any other 
reasonable hypothesis. All circumstances (this 
includes wool fibers, leather, blood typing, 
absence of blood on trousers, and so forth) 
must be consistent and all, t aken together, 
must point surely and unerringly to the guilt 
of the defendant, and must be inconsistent with 
any other rational supposition than that the 
defendant is guilty of the offense charged. 
* * * * 
Not every fact and circumstance in a · case 
needs . to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
but every essential link in the chain of 
circumstances necessary to prove each or any 
of the charges, as claimed by the State, must 
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
inference which they compel should not be 
that the defendant might have done the deed, 
but that he actually did it. If for any 
reason the facts relied on for conviction in 
a criminal prosecution are not consistent 
each with the other, and are not all consist-
ent with the hypothesis of guilt and no other 
hypothesis the State must fail." 
; 
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The following is cld law but good law. State vs. 
Snell, 2 Ohio Nisi Prius Reports 55, pa ge 61 the Court says: 
note 5: 
"Circumstantial evidence is a dmissible under 
our law to prcve the guilt of the defendant, but 
this kind of evidence can only be conclusive where 
every necessary link in the chain of circumstances 
from which the deduction of guilt is sought to be 
drawn, is proved beyond the existence of a reason-
able doubt; and if any fact or circumstance in the 
case necessary to be proved in order to draw the 
deduction or inference of guilt against the 
defendant is not proved beyond the existence of 
a reasonable doubt, then the jury would not be 
justified in returning a verdict of guilty;" 
Columbus vs Treadwell, 46 Abstracts 367, head-
"In crimina l proceedings in which it is sought 
to establish the guilt of the a ccused through 
circumstantia l evidence, an inference cannot be 
based upon another inference or upon a fact the 
existence of which in itself rests upon an 
inference." 
ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS CHARGE 
The overwhelming evidence establishe·s that he 
had an excellent reputation for peace and quiet. He never 
resorted to violence, kept his temper under most trying 
conditions and never violated any law against violence. In 
general his reputation for being a peaceful, temperate and 
self-controlled person was established. With that in the 
record the trial court charged the jury as follows: 
"Some evidence has been given in this case 
concerning the claimed general conduct and 
reputation of the defendant and it is proper 
to present such evidence for your considera-
tion. It is not admitted because it furnishes 
proof of guilt or innocence.***" 
This charge is directly contrary to the law of 
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Ohio. The statute on reasonable doubt 2945.04 R.C. states 
that: 
"It is that sta te of the case which, after 
the entire comparison and consideration of a ll 
the evidence, * * *" 
The trial court did not permit the jury to arrive 
at its verdict after a considerat ion of all of the evidence. 
Stewart vs State, . 22 Ohio State 477, paragraph 4 
of the syllabus: 
syllabus: 
"In a crimina l case it is error to instruct 
the jury that evidence of the defendant's 
good character is not to be considered by the 
jury, or mnde nvail~ble to the defendant, ex-
cept in doubtful cases; the true and proper 
rule being to leave the weight and bearing 
of such evidence to the jury. 
State vs. Hare et al., 87 Ohio State, 204 2nd 
"* * * and the court should have instructed 
the jury to consider the same (reputation 
evidence) in connection with all the other 
evidence in the case in arriving a t a verdict." 
Donaldson vs State, 5 O.C.D. 98, the syllbaus: 
"And instructions that the whole testimony 
should be looked at together, and if on a 
fair consideration of the whole of it a 
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt 
exists, it should go to his acquittal, but 
that if on the whcle evidence there is no 
such reasonable doubt of his guilt, the jury 
should so find, notwithstanding the proof 
to be: 
of' good character is misleading, for the-· 
reason that the language ~onveys the idea 
that evidence of good character is avail-
able only in otherwise doubtful case." 
Baum vs. State, 6 C.C. (N.S.) 515, holds the law 
"In a criminal case for assault with intent 
to kill, where the defendant put in evidence 
his previous good character, it is not error 
for the court to say to the jury that, 'the 
weight to be given the good character of the 
defendant for peace and quiet must be such 
that the jury under all the circumstances 
think it should receive. 111 
The portion of the court's charge above referred 
to is prejudicial to defendant. It is not the law of Ohio. 
Reputation as to peace and quiet is a part of the evidence 
and must be submitted to the jury together with all of the 
other evidence. In a doubtful case evidence of previous 
good character as to peace and quiet may be sufficient as to 
create a reasonable doubt~ This was a doubtful case. It 
was based on dubious circumstantial evidence. In spite of 
all of the hostile press, radio broadcasts and so forth, the 
jury in this case deliberated five whole days sometimes up 
to aslong as ten or twelve hours before reaching a verdict. 
The court almost suggested to the jury that the 
defendant was guilty when it gave an example of circumstantial 
evidence that if George Washington were seen carrying an axe 
out of the driveway of a man's house and it was discovered 
that a cherry tree had been chopped down that this was an 
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example or circumstantial evidence or the guilt or George 
Washington. 
The example given was merely that George Washington 
was there and hence was in a po s ition to chop the tree down. 
In the case at bar the defendant was in his home and his 
wife was murdered. And if George was guilty so was the 
defendant. This misled the jury and was unfair. 
The charge of the court tha t if the evidence 
counterbalanced one side against the other equally then the 
verdict should be acqui ttal . That eliminated completely the 
requirement that evidence b~yond a reasonable doubt is 
required before a conviction may be lawfully had. 
The case a t bar is of great public interest. When 
the State's case fails to meet the legal requirement of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, are the courts powerless 
to correct the mistake? No, indeed. 
There are two motions befbre the cou~t. One, an 
appeal of right on constitutional questions a nd the other 
a motion for leave to·appeal. The whole bill of exceptions 
in this casE indicates a l ack of due process of law, errors 
the court, a failure of proof, and other incidents 
on~istent with the sound administration of justice. 
foregoing is submitted in support of both 
This case is of such widespread importance not 
only to the bench and bar and people of Ohio but to people 
throughout the country, that these motions should be sus-
tained and the highest tribunal of justice in Ohio pass upon 
the merits and announce such rules of law as may be necessary 
to guide the bench and the bar in the future. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William J. Corrigan 
Arthur E. Petersilge 
Fred W. Garmone 
Paul M. Herbert 
Russell E. Leasure 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
(Parentheses and other forms of emphasis are ours.) 
; 
